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This paper contrasts the experience of two American companies in the same industry with 
diametrically opposed approaches to work, employee relations and business —Wal-Mart 
and Costco. The concept of institutional isomorphism notes a phenomenon amongst 
organisations with similar environments of adopting similar structures, strategies and 
practices. Isomorphism is used to explore the influences on Australian businesses in a 
new industrial relations environment to select either the Wal-Mart or Costco model as 
their approach to employment relations. It is argued that employers alone will not decide 
which ‘road’ to take. Coercive isomorphism in particular is argued to hold the key to 
whether Australian businesses select the ‘high road’ or the ‘low road’ approach.  
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the potential impact of the Howard government’s changes to Australian 
industrial relations (IR) by contrasting two American companies in the same industry with 
diametrically opposed approaches to work, labour relations and business – Wal-Mart and 
Costco. These organisations provide examples of the ‘high road’ (Costco) and the ‘low road’ 
(Wal-Mart) to wages, benefits, working conditions, participation and unionisation for 
American workers in the retail industry.  
Using an institutional theory of organisations, isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983), the 
paper explores pressures on organisations to conform to what is acceptable behaviour, 
structure or practice in their field or industry. This exploration centres on the choice to be 
made by Australian business of whether to adopt the Wal-Mart or the Costco way and 
whether this choice is for employers alone to make. It is argued that one mechanism of 
isomorphic organisational change, coercive isomorphism, is likely to be most influential in 
the ‘road’ chosen by Australian business.  The paper is divided into four central sections to 
explore: the concept of isomorphism; the companies in terms of their background, labour 
relations and economic performance; the new Australian IR environment; and the potential 
interactions between isomorphism and Australian business within the new IR arena. 
 
Isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that traditionally organisational structures were based 
on the rules of efficiency in the marketplace but have increasingly reflected the institutional 
constraints imposed by the state and the professions. Conformity with such requirements 
provides legitimacy and resource support rather than efficiency (Thompson & McHugh 
2002:79) and leads to ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Di Maggio & Powell 1983:147) whereby 
organisations increasingly come to resemble each other.  Isomorphism is defined as a 
‘constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set of environmental conditions’ (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:147). As Clegg, Kornberger 
and Pitsis (2005:53) note, the effect of isomorphism is to limit an organisation’s operating 
choices to those viewed as standard or acceptable in its field or industry.  
Institutional theories tend ‘to focus on and reinforce national differences. The immediate 
problem with this perspective is to account for change and the dynamic nature of economies 
that are global, not nationally bound systems’ (Smith & Meiksins 1995:3). This is especially 
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true of industrial relations which are increasingly being forged at regional and supra-national 
levels, rather than nationally as in the past (Howarth & Hughes 2000). This means two things 
in terms of isomorphism and its potential effect on Australian IR. The first is that 
globalisation provides avenues for isomorphism (not only for organisations but also in terms 
of professions and state policy decisions). Thus large global organisations (such as IBM or 
Macdonalds) or large nation states (USA for example) are the ‘carriers’ of distinct practices 
which influence others’ operations (Whitley 1987). Secondly, there is always strategic choice 
within constraints (Warhurst 1997).  Whether an organisation responds to national or 
international pressures may be related to national issues (social, historical, economic) or to the 
individual culture or philosophy of an organisation, developed by its founder. Thus 
convergence of the type suggested by Di Maggio and Powell need not be towards only one 
organisational structure or operational system.   
Di Maggio and Powell (1983:148-153) advance three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic 
change. Mimetic processes occur through imitation and are encouraged by employee 
migration, consulting firms, and uncertainty.  Normative pressures are those generally brought 
about by professions, especially through norms developed during education where a dominant 
paradigm exists. These are later reinforced through on-the-job socialisation. Coercive 
isomorphism results when change is influenced by pressure from other organisations upon 
which a firm is dependent, cultural or societal expectations, or government mandates or 
regulation. Although Donaldson’s (1995) review of empirical evidence suggests that only 
coercive isomorphism receives unequivocal empirical support, DiMaggio and Powell’s 
construct provides a useful framework for a discussion of its potential effects in Australia, 




Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated (Wal-Mart) began in the early 1960s and is now America’s 
largest private sector employer with a global workforce of approximately 1.3 million 
employees called ‘associates.’ Its annual revenue of $US256 billion in 2004 (Wal-Mart 2005) 
amounted to two percent of the American Gross Domestic Product (Miller 2004:3). Through 
its 5,000 mega-stores and wholesale warehouse club (Sam’s Club) Wal-Mart sells a very wide 
range of goods including toys, groceries, apparel, furniture, appliances, electronics, sports, 
baby, and pharmacy, and has even made an application for a bank charter in Utah 
(Featherstone 2005). Sam’s Club warehouse stores are in direct competition with Costco. 
Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) began life as the ‘Price Club’ in 1976 and is now the 
fifth largest retailer in the US with a global workforce of about 113,000 employees and annual 
revenue in 2004 of $US47.15 billion (Herbst 2005:4). Unlike Wal-Mart, Costco operates 
wholesale warehouse clubs open only to members and their guests. Costco’s 336 US stores 
sell a comparable range of goods to Wal-Mart (Costco 2005) but rather than stocking a full 
range of products from all major brands within each category, Costco carries limited popular 
product categories along with selected products across each category (Wikiedia 2005). This 
allows Costco to concentrate more on higher-margin goods and services (finance, phone, 
travel) that attract a wealthier customer base than Wal-Mart stores (Costco 2005; Herbst 
2005:3) and is a bit more ‘upscale’ than Sam’s Club (Nazareno 2005).  
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Labour Relations 
As competitors in the warehouse club industry, both Sam’s Club and Costco share the core 
strategy of off-setting low prices with high volume turnover to create profit flow. However, 
when it comes to labour relations, the two competitors adopt diametrically opposed 
philosophies.  
Sam’s Club adopts the central Wal-Mart philosophy that consumer demand for low prices 
means that not only must goods be produced and sold cheaply but retail wages must also be 
kept as low as possible (Herbst 2005:1). Wal-Mart demands strict obedience from rank and 
file employees and has designed ‘an elaborate aptitude test for new employees that is intended 
to weed out troublemakers’ (Head 2004:6). While screening of this nature appears to be 
broadly successful it is not totally failsafe and some ‘troublemakers’ do slip through the net.  
The Wal-Mart labour relations philosophy is totally anti-union. The company has gone to 
considerable lengths to prevent its employees from organising (Miller 2004:4). Wal-Mart has 
issued managers with a ‘toolbox’ that lists ‘warning signs’ that workers may be organising 
and provides a ‘hotline number’ to company anti-union specialists (Miller 2004:4). Even a 
cursory search uncovers considerable Wal-Mart anti-union activity, and only a few examples 
are outlined here. Several former and current Wal-Mart executives faced a federal grand jury 
investigation over allegations made by a former Vice Chairman that the company authorised 
fraudulent expense reports to fund illegal anti-union campaigns (Wal-Mart Watch 2005a). In 
Quebec, Canada the company closed a store after the 190 employees voted for union 
representation, and is now facing a class-action suit with a claim for Wal-Mart to pay up to 
$20,000 compensation to each worker (Canadian Press 2005). In November 2004 the Tire and 
Lube Department at a Wal-Mart store in Denver Colorado won the right to hold a union ballot 
in February 2005. In the interim Wal-Mart ‘changed the electorate’ by transferring several 
hand-picked employees into the department to skew the vote against the union (Newman 
2005). When meatworkers in a Texas store managed to successfully organise a union, Wal-
Mart announced the phase-out of meat-cutting departments and it took the workers three years 
to win their jobs back and force the company to bargain with their union. Wal-Mart is 
appealing the decision and refuses to deal with the union (Miller 2004:4). 
Possibly reflecting the current CEO and co-founder’s background whose father was a coal 
miner and steelworker, Costco’s labour relations philosophy is that employees deserve a fair 
share of the profits they help generate (Herbst 2005:3). The International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (the Teamsters) appears to have representative rights at Costco and has around 
15,000 members. The chief union negotiator with Costco is quoted as stating that the 
company ‘gave us the best agreement of any retailer in the country’ (Greenhouse 2005:3). 
Unlike Australia, when a union wins a representative ballot under US law all employees 
included in the bargaining unit must either join the union or pay a fee to compensate the union 
for negotiating on their behalf and enforcing the agreement. Thus, although only about 13 per 
cent of Costco employees are union members, the ‘union effect’ at Costco stores is much 
greater as the union must represent non-union employees covered by the agreement.   
These disparate philosophies translate into considerable differences in wages and conditions, 
not only for employees but also for top management. In 2004 the Costco CEO’s total 
remuneration package was $US2.7 million ($US350,000 base salary) while the Wal-Mart 
equivalent received $US17.5 million ($US1.2m  base salary) (Graef 2005). For wage 
employees the opposite holds true as the average pay for Wal-Mart employees is $US9.68 per 
hour compared to $US16 per hour at Costco (Herbst 2005:4), while the average American 
supermarket employee earns $US10.35 per hour (Miller 2004:4). In an average 34 hour 
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workweek many of Wal-Mart’s employees earn less than the 2001 US Federal poverty line 
amount for a family of three (Miller 2004:4). 
The core of the American health care system is employer-based health coverage. Only 48 per 
cent of Wal-Mart employees are covered by company health insurance and are required to pay 
between 34 per cent and 42 per cent of premiums, plus an excess ($US350-1,000). In contrast, 
the Costco health scheme covers 82 per cent of the workforce, employees only pay between 5 
per cent and 8 per cent and there is no excess (Herbst 2005:5; Miller 2004:7). The Wal-Mart 
health plan shifts costs onto the already low paid employees. It is estimated that it would take 
an $US8 an hour employee, working the average 34 hour week, close to a month and a half of 
pre-tax pay for one year’s family coverage. Not surprisingly many rely on public assistance 
for health care and in California alone taxpayers subsidised $US20.5 million in health care for 
Wal-Mart employees in 2001 (Miller 2004:8). 
These different approaches to labour relations also influence the general tenor of employee–
management relations. Wal-Mart is facing a sex discrimination class action that dates back to 
2001 when six former and current female employees brought an action alleging denial of 
equal pay and opportunities for promotion (Head 2004:5-7). The lawsuit expanded to 
potentially the largest in US history to cover 1.6 million current and former female employees 
when a federal judge ruled the case could proceed as a class action. Wal-Mart has appealed 
the decision (Karpeles 2005). 
The federal US Fair Labor Standards Act and equivalent state laws require that hourly 
employees be paid for all hours worked, and overtime after a maximum number of hours 
(usually 40 hours a week). As at December 2002 Wal-Mart was facing 39 class-actions for 
unpaid working time. In 2001 Wal-Mart paid $US50 million in unpaid wages to 69,000 
workers in Colorado and $US500,000 to 120 workers in New Mexico (Miller 2005:5). In 
2005 Wal-Mart paid $US11 million in settlement of a federal investigation into their use of 
illegal immigrants (Wal-Mart Watch 2005b). 
Very little evidence of similarly negative labour relations concerning Costco was found. One 
explanation is the ‘real advantage’ of union representation (Herbst 2005:4). When labour 
problems arise they tend to be settled in-house through negotiations with the union rather than 
in the court system. The one court case uncovered (Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale) concerned a 
female employee’s religious right to body piercing. Despite considerable negotiation and 
accommodation by Costco following policy changes the employee won a discrimination case, 
and then sought monetary compensation. The court eventually found that her refusal to accept 
a reasonable compromise offered by Costco would undermine company policy, and found in 
favour of Costco (Nixon Peabody 2005). 
 
Economic Performance 
A familiar mantra in recent decades has been that if a company or an economy wants to stay 
competitive in a global economy continuous productivity improvements are required. Too 
often however, productivity increases are confused with cost cutting, in particular the 
reduction in workers’ take home pay, which may lead to more profits but not increased 
productivity (Peetz 2005). Contrasting the economic performance of Costco and Sam’s Club 
highlights the issue. 
Although the average hourly full-time wage at Sam’s Club ($US11.52) is higher than the 
Wal-Mart average ($US9.68) it remains close to 40 per cent less than Costco’s ($US16) 
(Holmes & Zellner 2004). However, when labour costs are examined as a percentage of sales, 
Costco records lower labour costs because Sam’s Club employees generate around $US35 
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billion in annual sales while Costco achieved $US34 billion with one-third fewer employees 
(Holmes & Zellner 2004). Looked at another way, Costco’s operating profit per hourly 
employee in 2003 was $US13,647 compared to $US11,039 for Sam’s Club. Costco’s workers 
sell 50 per cent more per square foot of sales space and contribute almost 25 per cent more to 
profits than Sam’s Club employees (Bonior 2005). 
Costco management argues that its more productive workforce is a direct result of the higher 
wages and better conditions (Herbst 2005).  As labour turnover is reduced (only 6 per cent of 
employees leave in the first year compared to 21per cent at Sam’s Club), staff is more 
experienced and more motivated (Holmes & Zellner 2004), and even theft is substantially 
reduced (Greenhouse 2005).  
In March 2004 Costco exceeded Wall Street expectations by posting a 25 per cent profit gain 
and a 14 per cent sales hike, but instead of a positive response the market drove the 
company’s stock down 4 per cent (Holmes & Zellner 2004). The reason for this counter-
intuitive response appears to be that market analysts and traders are caught up in the ‘Wal-
Martisation’ of the American economy. This school of thought adheres to the belief that 
shareholders’ needs require employers to minimise costs, including labour costs (Greenhouse 
2005; Holmes & Zellner 2004; Hightower 2004).  Bill Dreher, an analyst for Deutsche Bank, 
stated that ‘Costco’s corporate philosophy is to put its customers first, then its employees, 
then its vendors and finally its shareholders. Shareholders get the short end of the stick’ (cited 
in Herbst 2005), and ‘At Costco, it’s better to be an employee or a customer than a 
shareholder’ (cited in Holmes and Zellner 2004). These sentiments are shared by many other 
stock analysts (Greenhouse 2005; Holmes & Zellner 2004; Shaffer 2005).  
Despite the criticisms of Wall Street professionals, Costco shares have quadrupled over the 
past ten years. Analysts have branded Costco a ‘cult stock’ with the only explanation for the 
high share price being ‘so many people love the company’, implying this is a negative 
phenomenon (Herbst 2005).   
 
Isomorphism and the companies 
Wal-Mart and Costco represent opposite ends of a continuum in terms of their industrial 
relations philosophies and labour relations practices. Despite the apparent contradiction of 
having two such divergent models, isomorphism is present. Mimetic processes (imitation) are 
apparent in the ‘Wal-Martization’ of the US economy.  The glorification of Wal-Mart’s 
labour relations in the US business media as the central reason for its success (Shaffer 2005) 
results in many executive simply imitating the Wal-Mart low-pay route in search of success. 
Normative pressures are also apparent in the low wage—high wage dichotomy. Examples of 
a professional management alliance supporting the Wal-Mart model are evident in most 
American articles on this topic (Greenhouse 2005; Holmes & Zellner 2004; Herbst 2005; 
Miller 2004; ARAW 2005). In his examination of media coverage of Wal-Mart labour 
relations Shaffer (2005) argues that this ideological fusion is reflected relatively equally in 
both the conservative, business orientated Wall Street Journal and the business section of 
‘liberal’ New York Times. However, normative pressures are even more apparent in the 
sentiments adopted by many ‘professional’ stock analysts as discussed above. The prevailing 
‘Wall Street’ belief that shareholders are best served when labour costs are minimised exerts 
considerable pressure on executives to ‘toe-the-line’ or risk negative assessments and 
potential stock price falls – particularly important when salary packages are tied to stock 
performance.  
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The third mechanism of institutional isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
coercive isomorphism, is arguably the most influential in determining whether an organisation 
adopts the Wal-Mart or Costco model. The massive buying power of Wal-Mart allows them 
to dictate the price they are willing to pay for a product, often forcing suppliers of goods or 
services to adopt the low-wage model (and in some cases exploit illegal immigrants) (Miller 
2004). Wal-Mart’s financial support of political candidates who shared the company’s low-
wage philosophy made the company the second highest contributor in the 2004 campaign, 
with 85 per cent of donations going to Republican candidates (Hopkins 2004). Somewhat 
ironically, during the same period Wal-Mart was presented with a presidential award, the Ron 
Brown Award for Corporate Leadership, for outstanding achievements in employee relations 
and community initiatives. These relationships and the media coverage they generate 
perpetuate the allure and legitimacy of the Wal-Mart model in the eyes of company 
executives, investors, customers and even workers. 
At present, while isomorphic pressures are favouring the spread of the Wal-Mart model in the 
US, the environment (and consumer satisfaction) is permitting both models to operate. 
Whether the Costco model is forced out of the market by these pressures, or can create 
sufficient convergence of its own remains to be seen. 
 
The New Australian Industrial Relations Environment 
The Howard government’s recent IR agenda has been to remove any vestiges of the 
traditional award system and move to a legislated national minima scheme in which only five 
minimum standards would be protected. These are minimum wages (set by a new Fair Pay 
Commission not the AIRC); annual leave; personal/carer’s leave, parental leave (including 
maternity leave); and maximum ordinary hours of work. As a package, the Australian 
Government refers to these legislated minima as the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions 
Standard (the Standard) (Australian Government 2005).  
While the actual standards to be established by each minima remain uncertain at this time, the 
relationships of particular aspects of the system are known. For example, while awards will 
continue to exist (albeit in an even more simplified form) they will no longer be the 
benchmark for the no disadvantage test (which itself is removed). The five statutory minima 
contained in ‘the Standard’ will establish the benchmark (Australian Government 2005). 
Similarly, while the Fair Wage Commission will not cut minimum wages in nominal terms it 
is clear that the minimum rate will fall relative to average earnings and most likely in real 
terms during recessions (Gittins 2005). Further, by drawing on the corporations power of the 
Constitution these changes will apply to all incorporated companies across Australia, 
rendering the state IR systems virtually redundant (McCallum 2003:1). 
The government argues that these changes are required to maintain Australia’s economic 
performance and to secure our economic future. Others offer a different perspective. In 
summarising the concerns of many opposed to the changes, Gittins (2005:1) states the 
government has ‘five main objectives: to get the states out of industrial relations; minimise 
the role of the Industrial Relations Commission, get people away from awards, weaken the 
union movement and discourage collective bargaining.’ One flow-on of these objectives is 
that the new system will have a bias in favour of the government’s preferred approach, a wide 
spread shift to individual bargaining through Australian Workplace Agreements.  
For the purposes of this paper the pros and cons of the proposed reforms and the specifics of 
the changes are by and large a moot point. The key point is that the new legislated minima, 
combined with the shift to individual agreements, will for the first time since 1904 give 
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employers the ability to legally choose whether to adopt a low-wage model (Wal-Mart) or a 
high-wage model (Costco). Is this choice solely the preserve of employers or are there other 
players across society who can influence the outcomes? Drawing on institutional theory of 
organisations and the concept of isomorphism discussed earlier, the issue of influence in 
decision-making of this type is considered in the following section. 
 
Influence and Isomorphism: the potential and the limits 
While DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that organisational structures and practices 
converge, others suggest that such convergence need not be around a single model or form 
and this is obvious from the case study organisations. Cultural, historical, economic, national 
and international factors may influence the pattern of convergence. Undoubtedly, employers 
will have a major say in the type of model adopted within the companies they manage but 
other factors may also influence the decision.  
Although the omni-presence of the Wal-Mart model has been a greater driver of mimetic 
processes to date, organisations such as the American Rights at Work (ARAW 2005) are 
providing alternative role models. ARAW’s Labor Day List, which celebrates partnerships 
between employers and their employees’ unions, is not only generating publicity but also 
provides educative case studies (and access to more in-depth information) which interested 
companies can follow. While hardly competing with the mainstream media’s portrayal of the 
inevitability of the Wal-Mart model, these alternative approaches could be adopted by 
concerned interest groups within Australia. They could be a means of educating employers 
who are uncomfortable with the exploitative aspects of the low-wage approach, or putting 
pressure on those employers seen as eager to reduce employees’ wages and conditions.  These 
mimetic and normative pressures could lead to convergence around the Costco model. 
With the maturing of pension or superannuation investments the share market is no longer the 
preserve of the elite. According to British social theorist Paul Hirst, pension and 
superannuation funds represent the largest pool of socially-owned capital in history (cited in 
Morton 2000:1). While US unions have been using their influence over the $US5 trillion of 
pension fund investments to improve the lot of their members (Morton 2000:1), Australian 
unions have been more reluctant to use workers’ ownership of the means of production in a 
similar manner (Wade 2001). The broad argument is that if union influence on industry super 
funds was used to encourage ethical investing, especially by not investing in companies that 
exploit workers through low wages or poor conditions, pressure could be applied across the 
economy through ethical supply chain requirements. As Wade (2001) argues, ownership in a 
capitalist system confers the right to legitimate influence but Australian industry super funds 
are laggards (Morton 2000:9), exercising their proxy votes in less than half of possible 
occasions (Lampe 2004).  
The fiduciary duty of superannuation fund trustees only requires they evaluate ethical 
investments using the same criteria as traditional investments. Providing such separate 
ethically based investment options reduces any legal controversy for trustees (Findlaw). It is 
conceivable that fund trustees could screen a company’s workplace relations record and the 
adoption of the low wage model, union busting, or other anti-worker policies would prohibit 
investment. However the presence of employer representatives on Australian industry 
superannuation funds’ boards could limit the extent to which IR agendas are pursued through 
this avenue (Trounson 2005). 
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Other normative pressures emanating from broader society such as church-based think tanks 
and non-government welfare organisations can highlight the pitfalls of the low-wage model 
and influence companies through moral suasion.  
Successive Workplace Relations Ministers have been critical of businesses’ reluctance to fully 
adopt the opportunities offered under the Workplace Relations Act 1996. It is hard to imagine 
that the special briefing on the proposed changes given to business community leaders in 
October 2005 (O’Brien 2005) was not designed to both reinforce business support on a united 
front and to ‘encourage’ the adoption of the full package of changes. Since the passing of the 
legislation in the Senate on Friday 3 December 2005 the Business Council of Australia has 
been urging employers to move quickly to take advantage of the new laws (Norrington 2005). 
In the case of universities the government has attached industrial relations conditions to 
funding, clearly a coercive move to force a convergence of employment relations to the 
government’s philosophy. The government has engaged a legal firm to examine each 
university’s certified agreement, and to specify how that university will comply with its new 
IR requirements (NTEU 2005). Similarly, companies which may require government 
intervention for regulatory ‘adjustments’, investment seed money, tax breaks, disaster aid and 
so forth, may find themselves obligated to implement a non-preferred IR approach in 
exchange for the resources or assistance they need. However, the government is not the only 
party that can coerce employers into adopting the ‘low road’. Through supply chain 
arrangements, sub-contracting and outsourcing large organisations can influence others, 
forcing them to adopt their methods or lose their business, as in the transport industry for 
example (Quinlan 2001). Thus, the decision to adopt either a ‘high road’ or a ‘low road’ in 
terms of employment conditions is not necessarily an individual one. 
 
Conclusion 
Isomorphism has been used to consider the adoption of structures and practices by 
organisations that are considered legitimate or acceptable in their field, industry or region. 
While Di Maggio and Powell (1983) have identified a convergence of such structures and 
practices for a number of reasons, there need not be only one model around which the 
convergence occurs. Thus, while many Australian employers are espousing the need to 
choose business models that raise profits and productivity at the expense of wages, benefits 
and working conditions, they need not all adopt the ‘low road’ Wal-Mart model offered by the 
new IR reforms. Many Australian employers have forged good working relations with unions, 
are happy with the current system, or are ambivalent about the impact of the Howard 
government’s changes on their operations. 
All three mechanisms by which isomorphism occurs will be evident in the IR outcomes. 
While mimetic and normative pressures will have some influence on decisions, coercive 
isomorphism will be a key factor in the extent to which Australian employers adopt the more 
extreme elements of the IR reforms, and converge on the ‘low road’ approach. How much 
pressure can be placed on individual employers and industry sectors to adopt the Wal-Mart 
way remains to be seen, but the pressure being brought to bear on individual universities may 
be indicative of a wider approach by government to achieve its aims. 
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